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The interaction of oil exports from the Middle East in the 1970s 
with arms imports to this region has drawn attention from several 
researchers. The existinq literature, however, is seriouslv 
flawed for it ignores the large corporate players wtrose actions 
synchronize the two flows of income and, thus, fails to identify 
the significance of these corporations for the political economy 
of armaments. This present paper is the first of a series of 
four essays that attempt to relate the dynamics of market 
structures to the escalation of military sales. Here we briefly 
assess some neo-Marxist and institutional writings that offer 
insight into the subject of relevant issues. We find them 
deficient and perhaps outdated in some respects. 
RJESI JNE 
L1int&raction entre les exportations de petrole, des annCes 1970 
et les importations d'armes du Moyen-Orient n'ont pas manquC 
d'attirer l'attention de plusieurs chercheurs. Les documents 
existants affichent toutefois de skrieuses lacunes dans la mesure 
ou ils ignorent les qrands intervenants du secteur privC dont les 
actes synchronisent les deux sources de revenus et, par 
consequent, omettent d'identifier l'importance de ces entreprises 
dans 1'Bconomie politique de l'arme~nent. Cet article est le 
premier d'une sPrie de quatre dont le but est dlCtablir un lien 
entre la dynamique des structures du marche et l'escalade des 
ventes d'armements. Un certain nombre d'4crits nCo-marxistes et 
institutionnels sont PvaluCs, lesquels permettent de .jeter une 
lumiPre intkressante sur certaines questions pertinentes. A 
d'autres Pgards, ces Ccrits sont quelque peu inst~ffisants, voire 
dPgassCs. 
Since the  beginning of t h e  present  century, t h e  economic s ign i f i cance  
of t h e  Middle East has pr imar i ly  stemmed from t h e  o i l  exports  of t h i s  
region.  Such s ign i f i cance  has been shared with a newer flow of arms imports 
in the  last two decades. A s  o i l  c r i s e s  became t i e d  t o  armed c o n f l i c t s  in t h e  
region,  the re  developed a growing and increas ingly  synchronized movement of 
petradollars (revenues from petroleum exports  t h a t  flowed i n t o  t h e  Middle 
Eas t )  and armadollars (revenues from arms imports t h a t  flowed out  of t h e  
region) .  Some i n t e r e s t  in the  re la t ionsh ips  l inking these  two flows has been 
expressed in both governmental and academic l i t e r a t u r e .  However, t h i s  
i n t e r e s t  has f a i l e d ,  in genera l ,  t o  i d e n t i f y  these  re la t ionsh ips  as a 
s a l i e n t  new f e a t u r e  in the  p o l i t i c a l  economy of armaments. Moreover, we f e e l  
t h a t  such l i t e r a t u r e  has of ten  been mis-directed by ignoring one group of 
the  p r inc ipa l  a c t o r s  (namely, the  large o i l  and armament corporat ions)  i n  
t h e  economic drama t h a t  has been unfolding here .  In  t h i s  paper, w e  b r i e f l y  
summarize a few streams of academic research t h a t  attempt t o  d e a l  with t h e  
macroeconomic impact of military spending and with some s t r u c t u r a l  issues. 
This present  summary prepares t h e  way f o r  our d iscuss ion,  in th ree  companion 
papers, of new s t r u c t u r a l  concepts such as t h e  'armament core '  and t h e  
'armadollar-petrodollar c o a l i t i o n '  in r e l a t i o n  t o  h i s t o r i c a l  developments i n  
t h e  Middle East and t h e  United S t a t e s .  
Most academic s t u d i e s  point  t o  t h e  i ssue  of balance between t h e  two 
flows of pe t rodo l la r s  and armadollars and seek t o  assess  t h e  economic 
f e a s i b i l i t y  of ' r ecyc l ing ' .  For example, Chan (1980, p .  236) is typ ica l  when 
he notes t h a t  ' the  sharp increase i n  o i l  p r ice  during the  1973-74 period 
presented a very d i f f i c u l t  balance of payment problem f o r  many nations,  
including some o i l  exporting countries that were suddenly faced with major 
investment decisions f o r  t h e i r  unexpectedly large surpluses '  and then 
examines o i l  and arms-related monetary flows f o r  a heterogeneous group of 56 
countries.  O t h e r  researchers focus exclusively on the  s i tua t ion  of Western 
arms-exporting countries.  Snider (1984, p.  665), f o r  instance, asks whether 
governments of the  United S ta tes ,  Bri ta in ,  France, West Germany and I t a l y  
a r e  permitting arms exports t o  o f f s e t  t he  cost  of imported o i l .  Other 
s t ud i e s  in the  recycling l i t e r a t u r e  include those of Ray (1976), Willr ich 
(1975), P ie r re  (1982), Kemp and Miller (1979), Pfal tzgraff  (1978) and 
Kolodziej (1980). Their conclusions reveal  views t h a t  m i l i t a r y  imports, 
while providing an ou t l e t  f o r  o i l  revenues, a l so  serve t o  bo ls te r  t h e  ' se l f -  
image' of o i l - r i ch  countries and enhance the  degree of in te rna l  s t a b i l i t y  
that they experience. Also some authors conclude mi l i t a ry  sales w i l l  
insula te  arms-exporting countries from the  negative e f f e c t s  of fu r the r  
external  changes in the  internat ional  f inanc ia l  and t rading systems (Chan, 
pp. 237-8, and Snider, p. 668). 
The macroeconomic format of these academic s tud ies  d i v e r t s  a t t en t ion  
away from the nature of underlying s t ruc tures .  Thus the  s tud ies  e f fec t ive ly  
ignore the  handful of large o i l  corporations which dominate the  world o i l  
market and hence obtain most of the  world's petroprofits. The s tud ies  a l s o  
overlook the  c lu s t e r  of large armament concerns which produce most Western 
arms exports and receive the  ensuing armaprofits. These omissions are 
unfortunate in our opinion. The six largest o i l  companies -- Exxon, Royal 
DutcWShell,  Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, and B r i t i s h  Petroleum -- recorded some 
$220 b i l l i o n  of n e t  p r o f i t s  over the  period extending from 1966 t o  1987. 
(See the  e n t r i e s  of Table 1 f o r  more information on the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
these  p r o f i t s . )  Such income is p o s i t i v e l y  co r re la t ed  t o  t h e  l e v e l  of o i l  
p r i c e s  and negat ive ly  connected t o  the  economic performance of Western 
i n d u s t r i a l  coun t r i e s .  The n ine  l a r g e s t  armament corpora t ions  -- Boeing, 
General Dynamics, General E l e c t r i c ,  Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, 
Raytheon, Rockwell In te rna t iona l ,  and United Technologies -- were l e s s  
conspicuously successful  f o r  t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  n e t  p r o f i t s  reached only $55 
b i l l i o n  in  t h e  same per iod.  (See Table 2 f o r  more complete informat ion . )  
These corporat ions mainly produce f o r  the  U.S. army, although they a l s o  
engage in c i v i l i a n  production, but  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  a r e  q u i t e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  sales of arms t o  the  Middle Eas t .  
The a c t i v i t i e s  of these  large corpora t ions  suggest  t h a t  economic 
t h e o r i s t s  should introduce s t r u c t u r a l  elements i n t o  t h e i r  research in order  
t o  capture a r e a l i s t i c  image f o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  economy of military 
expenditure and o i l  revenues. In  our b r i e f  survey, w e  begin with neo-Marxist 
views and some e a r l i e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t  t h e o r i e s  which have addressed t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  economy of arms, e s p e c i a l l y  by t h e i r  at tempts t o  connect military 
spending in the  United S t a t e s  with the  dynamics of t h e  U.S. market 
s t r u c t u r e .  We argue t h a t  these  theor ie s  may provide a few valuable i n s i g h t s  
but  they a r e  a l s o  d e f i c i e n t ,  perhaps outdated, in c e r t a i n  important 
r e spec t s .  An a l t e r n a t i v e ,  hopefully b e t t e r ,  perspect ive  is sought in  our 
companion papers. 
2.  Awnroness : Reg- . . 
Given t h e  s i z e  of t h e  major o i l  and armament companies and t h e i r  small 
number, the re  is a press ing need t o  move beyond t h e  fami l i a r  neoc lass ica l  
framework of economists with its bas ic  assumptions of f r e e  en t ry ,  p r i c e  
t akers ,  omniscient decision-makers and powerlessness. S imi lar ly ,  w e  cannot 
avoid e i t h e r  a somewhat bela ted  recognit ion of the  fundamental asymmetries 
that occur in t h e  process of economic development o r  o ther  s i g n i f i c s n t  
f e a t u r e s  of economic systems t h a t  must preclude f l e x i b l e  adjustment of 
economic a c t i v i t i e s .  These real c o n s t r a i n t s  f u r t h e r  weaken the  relevance of 
t h e  common neoc lass ica l  framework f o r  any perceptive treatment of t h e  arms 
and o i l  i n d u s t r i e s  of t h i s  century. Thus w e  should not  be surpr ised  t o  f i n d  
t h a t  many assessments of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  r e la t ionsh ips  e x i s t i n g  within these  
i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  not  rooted in t h e  neoclass ica l  framework but  r a t h e r  a r e  
f i rmly based on some neo-Marxist and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  theor ies ,  which emerged 
i n  the  1930s and were subsequently revived i n  t h e  1960s when involvement i n  
t h e  Vietnam c o n f l i c t  a f fec ted  t h e  U.S. economy. 
An important precursor f o r  such t h e o r i e s  was Veblen (1904, 1923). He 
was perhaps t h e  f i r s t  modern economist t o  place t h e  dynamics of market 
s t r u c t u r e  (and p a r t i c u l a r l y  ownership) a t  t h e  core of economic ana lys i s  and 
he iden t i f i ed  t h e  c e n t r a l  r o l e  of ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l  waste' i n  t h e  evolution of 
c a p i t a l i s t  economies. Unfortunately, Veblen could not  provide statistical 
d a t a ,  h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  were r a r e l y  developed i n  a systematic 
fashion,  and the  s a r c a s t i c  s t y l e  of h i s  commentaries served t o  i s o l a t e  h i s  
impact from t h e  neoclass ica l  paradigm and r e l a t e d  ideologies t h a t  became 
predominant in  academic c i r c l e s .  A wider re-examination came only a f t e r  t h e  
emergence of systematic market f a i l u r e  with t h e  economic crises fol lowing 
t h e  1929 shock t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  system of t h e  United S t a t e s .  
By the  second hal f  of the  1930s, at  least t h r e e  major a t t a c k s  on 
mainstream economic t h e o r i e s  had occurred. A l l  involved s t r u c t u r a l  elements, 
more concern f o r  realism, and an appreciat ion f o r  h i s t o r i c a l  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  context .  Surpr is ingly ,  a l l  remain s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  economy of m i l i t a r y  expenditures today -- although a t tenuated  by a 
half  century of p o l i t i c a l  and economic change. Amongst these  a t t a c k s  were 
Keynes' demonstration t h a t  an inherent  equ i l ib ra t ion  need no t  remove t h e  
unpleasant spectre of mass unemployment; the  incomplete explora t ions  of 
a l t e r n a t i v e  market forms (imperfect o r  monopolistic competition) by Robinson 
and Chamberlin, which again drew a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  strategic conduct of f i rms 
and pointed t o  t h e  complexity of p r i c i n g  dec i s ions  f o r  t h e i r  outputs;  and 
t h e  empirical  s t u d i e s  of Means (1935) and Hall and Hitch (1939) t h a t  pointed 
t o  the  phenomenon of administered p r i c e s .  Research by S r a f f a  and Robinson on 
t h e  consequences of heterogeneity of economic agents  ( f o r  example, i n  
connection with the  meaning of c a p i t a l  aggregates)  had begun but  was no t  t o  
be e f f e c t i v e l y  recognized u n t i l  much l a t e r .  These a t t a c k s  were encouraged by 
t e n t a t i v e  governmental responses t o  crisis, which st imulated debate  and 
reintroduced concern f o r  both genera l  recovery and individual  hardship. To 
some ex ten t ,  it is f a i r  t o  say  t h a t  theor ie s  of ' p o l i t i c a l  economy' revived 
as t he  appl ica t ion  of t h e  e x i s t i n g  'economic' t h e o r i e s  disappointed both 
t h e i r  proponents and t h e i r  c r i t i c s .  
Kalecki (1938, 1943a) was a c t i v e  i n  t h i s  r ev iva l  of p o l i t i c a l  economy 
when he s t r e s sed  ' t h e  degree of monopoly' ( r a t h e r  than p e r f e c t  competi t ion) 
as t h e  core of a model f o r  price behaviour, which d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  between an 
i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  f o r  raw mater ia ls ,  where p r i c e s  f l u c t u a t e  with demand, and 
another s e c t o r  f o r  f in ished products  with cost-determined p r i c e s .  When 
combined with hor izonta l  curves f o r  short-run,  prime c o s t s  i n  t h e  f in ished-  
goods s e c t o r ,  t h i s  perspect ive  y i e l d s  a simple macroeconomic proposi t ion;  
namely, t h e  r a t i o  of u n i t  p r i c e  t o  u n i t  prime c o s t  is q u a 1  t o  t h e  r a t i o  of 
t o t a l  product value ( t h e  sum of overhead c o s t ,  p r o f i t ,  t h e  wage b i l l ,  and 
raw material c o s t )  t o  t o t a l  prime c o s t  (only t h e  wage b i l l  and raw material 
c o s t ) .  Kalecki f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  r a t i o  is determined by t h e  'degree of 
monopoly' which r e f l e c t s  t h e  a c t u a l  success of c a p i t a l i s t s  i n  r a i s i n g  t h e  
value of t h e  r a t i o .  This  t h e o r e t i c a l  construct ion seems somewhat remote from 
m i l i t a r y  expenditures except f o r  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of c a p i t a l i s t s '  power t o  
command higher p r o f i t s  in  some f a m i l i a r  i n d u s t r i a l  s i t u a t i o n s .  
For our purposes, Kalecki 's  perspect ive  is s i g n i f i c a n t  because he chose 
t o  inver t  popular methods of ana lys i s .  He began with t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
na t iona l  income and then ra t iona l i zed  t h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  by reference t o  
apparent changes in t h e  underlying s o c i a l  and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s  -- t h a t  
i s ,  he focused on major aspects of market s t r u c t u r e  t o  explore t h e  aggregate 
performance of a na t iona l  economy. This  approach led  him t o  t h e  bus iness  
cyc le ,  the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of successful  an t i - cyc l i ca l  p o l i c i e s ,  and t h e  long- 
run impact of c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  on economic performance with governments being 
driven by s o c i a l  pressures  and not  class n e u t r a l .  From t h i s  perspect ive ,  
prominent groups (such as t he  government, r e n t i e r  i n t e r e s t s ,  and i n d u s t r i a l  
l eader s )  are t r e a t e d  as c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  who d i s p l a y  mgjor s o c i a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and respond t o  p o l i t i c a l  inf luences .  
During t h e  194Os, macroeconomic t h e o r i s t s  were e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
governmental p o l i c i e s  t o  achieve f u l l  employment. Kalecki (1943b, p .  144) 
argued t h a t  such p o l i c i e s  can temporarily reverse  an economic slump but  any 
attempt t o  maintain f u l l  employment is l i k e l y  t o  e l i c i t  an unfavourable 
response f o r  it c o n s t i t u t e s  a d i r e c t  a s s a u l t  on the  ' c l a s s  i n s t i n c t '  of 
i n d u s t r i a l  leaders .  In  h i s  view, 
A s t rong  opposi t ion of 'bus iness  l eaders '  is l i k e l y  t o  be 
encountered . . .  In  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  a powerful bloc is l i k e l y  t o  be 
formed between b i g  business and the  rentier i n t e r e s t s  . . .  The 
pressures  of a l l  these  fo rces ,  and in p a r t i c u l a r  of b i g  business 
would most probably induce t h e  Government t o  r e tu rn  t o t h e  
orthodox pol icy  of c u t t i n g  down the  budget d e f i c i t .  
The use of such emotive language is f a r  from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t e r i l i t y  of 
conventional neoclass ica l  theor ie s  and it se rves  t o  remind u s  of profound 
d i f fe rences  between a l t e r n a t i v e  perspect ives  on pol icy  e f fec t iveness  . Many 
macroeconomists presumed the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of long-term s t a b i l i t y  with f u l l  
employment while Kalecki perceived an inherent  degree of i n s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  
flows from c l a s s  interests. 
Kalecki noted two a l t e r n a t i v e  ideal types f o r  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of m d e r n  
capi ta l i sm.  One of these  types r evea l s  a regime of c a p i t a l i s t  democracy in 
which t h e  government is caught between b i g  business and the  masses s o  its 
ac t ions  generate a ' p o l i t i c a l  business c y c l e ' .  The o ther  i d e a l  type is a 
f a s c i s t  regime i n  which t h e  opposition of business t o  government investment 
and f u l l  employment is removed by the  simple device of a f o r c e f u l  mi l i t a ry -  
spending pol icy  i n  an t i c ipa t ion  of f u t u r e  armed c o n f l i c t .  Recognition of 
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these  idea l  types is c l e a r l y  f ixed in  the  troubled c l imate  t h a t  prevailed 
when Kalecki expressed h i s  views. However, counter-cyclical expenditures and 
a commitment t o  military spending are easy t o  i d e n t i f y  f o r  most advanced 
c a p i t a l i s t  economies even now. The in te rac t ion  of business support and 
m i l i t a r y  spending is a l s o  d i sce rn ib le  even i f  we might perhaps h e s i t a t e  
before descr ib ing some governments as f a s c i s t .  
Concern f o r  t h e  business cycle ,  s o  pressing in Kalecki ' s  work, 
diminished a f t e r  t h e  end of World War I1 when t h e  United S t a t e s  experienced 
two decades of almost uninterrupted prosper i ty .  For many economists, t h e  
business cycle  became 'obsole te '  except as a minor aspect  of growth and t h e  
NBER w a s  compelled t o  recast t h e  conventional d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  c y c l i c a l  
phases. Baran and Sweezy (1966) responded t o  t h e  new economic c l imate  of 
aff luence by seeking t o  amend Marxist theor ies  of development. These 
theor ies ,  t h e  two economists contended, were ill-equipped t o  d e a l  with t h e  
new r e a l i t y  f o r  they f a i l e d  t o  acknowledge t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  s h i f t  from 
competitive capi ta l i sm t o  what Baran and Sweezy described as 'monopoly 
cap i t a l i sm ' .  While keeping Kalecki 's emphasis f o r  the  degree of monopoly, 
Baran and Sweezy s t ressed  t h e  mechanisra by which price-cost r e l a t i o n s  were 
determined -- i n  con t ras t  t o  Kalecki who deduced t h e  degree of monopoly from 
an ex post examination of these  r e l a t i o n s .  
The argument of Baran and Sweezy was reasonably simple. They began with 
t h e  observation t h a t  the  dominant economic u n i t  i n  the  United S t a t e s  is the  
g i a n t  corporat ion,  f o r  which a t t e n t i o n  is focused on the  productive process .  
Given the  experience of p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  dur ing  the  1950s and 1960s, Baran 
and Sweezy argued t h a t  t h e  d i f fus ion  of o l i g o p o l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e s  within 
mature capitalist economies w i l l  genera te  a s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  of downward 
p r i ce - r ig id i ty  (perhaps even a modest upward b i a s ) .  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  
e a r l i e r  phenomenon of competitive capi ta l i sm,  when p r i c e  changes were t h e  
p ivot  influences,  t h e  main dynamic element of mature cap i t a l i sm t o  a f f e c t  
price-cost  r e l a t i o n s  is the  path  of product iv i ty .  This  element provides a 
means f o r  the  dominant form of i n d u s t r i a l  organizat ion t o  have a major 
macroeconomic impact on both c o s t s  and p r o f i t s :  
The whole motivation of c o s t  reduction is t o  increase  p r o f i t s  [and 
no t  t o  reduce p r i c e s ] ,  and t h e  monopolistic s t r u c t u r e  of markets 
enables the  corporat ions t o  appropriate t h e  l i o n ' s  sha re  of the  
f r u i t s  of increas ing product iv i ty  d i r e c t l y  in  t h e  form of higher 
p r o f i t s .  This  means t h a t  under monopoly cap i t a l i sm,  dec l in ing  
c o s t s  imply continuously widening p r o f i t  margins. And continuously 
widening p r o f i t  margins in turn  imply aggregate p r o f i t s  which rise 
no t  only absolute ly  but  as a share  of na t iona l  product.  (Baran and 
Sweezy, 1966, pp. 71-2) 
This  perspective led them t o  put  forward a s t rong  proposi t ion ( a  law of 
monopoly capi ta l i sm)  t h a t  i n  the  recent  economic condi t ions ,  ' i f  we 
provis ional ly  equate aggregate p r o f i t  with s o c i e t y ' s  economic su rp lus ,  . . .  
t he  su rp lus  tends t o  rise both absolute ly  and r e l a t i v e l y  as t h e  system 
develops . '  (ibid., p.  72) 
The surplus ,  it was then argued, is mostly appropriated by t h e  g i a n t  
i n d u s t r i a l  corporat ions,  who thus  achieve r e l a t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  independence 
from any major r e l i a n c e  on external  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Consequently, 
the  na t iona l  economy is re l ieved from the  inherent  i n d u s t r i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  
t h a t  previously came about from the  specula t ive  a c t i v i t i e s  of the  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r e s t  groups t h a t  dominated 'b ig  bus iness '  a t  the  t u r n  of t h e  century [ a s  
descr ibed,  f o r  example, by Veblen (1904)l .  Ins tead  of assur ing  p rosper i ty ,  
however, the  a t t endan t  'tendency of t h e  su rp lus  t o  rise' now th rea tens  t h e  
United S t a t e s  with chronic s tagnat ion  (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p .  76) .  For 
t h e  su rp lus  t o  r i s e ,  t h e  surplus potential must ma te r i a l i ze  and be absorbed 
by being rec i rcu la ted  i n t o  new economic a c t i v i t y .  I n s u f f i c i e n t  means of 
absorption f o r  any growing su rp lus  p o t e n t i a l  is perceived within corpora te  
boardrooms as a lack of investment oppor tun i t i e s  so investment is c u r t a i l e d ,  
t h e  s o c i e t a l  su rp lus  is reduced, unemployment inc reases  and s t agna t ion  
occurs.  
What has t h i s  perspect ive  t o  say  on m i l i t a r y  spending? The answer l i e s  
i n  t h e  view of m i l i t a r y  expenditures as wasteful ( i n  t h e  sense of channeling 
a c t i v i t i e s  away from a productive process)  y e t  providing an e f f e c t i v e  
counterac t ing  influence on t h e  emergence and pe r s i s t ence  of s tagnat ion  by 
permi t t ing  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  of the  surplus!  Within Marxist l i t e r a t u r e  such as 
Magdoff and Sweezy (1985, p .  145), growth t h a t  is propelled by investment 
conta ins  t h e  seeds  f o r  its own demise: 
This  is indeed p a r t  of t h e  very nature  of investment: it no t  only 
responds t o  demand, it a l s o  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  demand . . .  Expanding 
i n d u s t r i a l  capaci ty  always ends up by c r e a t i n g  ovezcapacity: a 
s t rong  incent ive  t o  inves t  genera tes  a b u r s t  of investment which 
in tu rn  undermines t h e  incent ive  t o  i n v e s t .  
(This  view, of course,  is a p a r t i c u l a r  f a c e t  of t h e  wider search f o r  
'overproduction-underconsumption' cont radic t ions  t h a t  pervade much of t h e  
Marxist l i t e r a t u r e . )  On the  o ther  hand, i f  su rp lus  p o t e n t i a l  is wasted, it 
cannot c r e a t e  overcapacity. Among the  var ious  classes of wasteful  
expenditures, t h e  l a r g e s t  item and the  one t h a t  is most e f f e c t i v e  i n  
counteract ing s tagnat ion  is held t o  be m i l i t a r y  spending.1 
4 .  Waste ~ n r i  t he  V- 
The book Monopoly Capi ta l  by Baran and Sweezy was published in 1966, 
the  year in which m i l i t a r y  expenditures associa ted  with the  Vietnamese 
c o n f l i c t  f i r s t  exerted t h e i r  s u b s t a n t i a l  influence on t h e  progress of t h e  
U.S. economy. Such expenditures were l e s s  than 8 per  cent  of GNP in  t h i s  
year  but  they accounted f o r  about a t h i r d  of the  annual increase  in real 
GNP. [See Bureau of Economic Analysis (1986), The Natiunal Income and 
Prcduct Accounts of the  hi ted S t a t e s ,  1,929-1982. S t a t i s t i c a l  Tables, Table 
1 . 1 ,  p .  2.3 The treatment of Baran and Sweezy was an t i c ipa ted  by Tsuru in  an 
important Japanese a r t i c l e ,  e n t i t l e d  'Has Capital ism Changed?', which 
appeared about a decade e a r l i e r . 2  These authors  were concerned with t h e  
a b i l i t y  of mature capi ta l i sm t o  c i r c u l a t e  a growing accumulation of saving.  
Indeed, Tsuru focused on the  empirical  aspects  of ' o f f s e t s  t o  savings '  a f t e r  
def in ing these  o f f s e t s  t o  savings as the  s u m  of a l l  GNE components o the r  
than personal  consumption. He drew a t t e n t i o n  t o  movements in  two simple 
ind ica to r s ;  namely, the  aggregate corporate r a t e  of p r o f i t  (as represented 
by the  r a t i o  of reported n e t  p r o f i t s  t o  shareholders '  equ i ty )  and the  sha re  
of corporate savings (taken as the  sum of undis t r ibuted  p r o f i t s ,  
deprecia t ion  and deple t ion  allowances) in GNP. Evidence was pu t  forward t o  
show t h a t  values f o r  both indices  were s u b s t a n t i a l l y  and consistency higher 
i n  the  years  following the  end of World War I1 r e l a t i v e  t o  va lues  
experienced during t h e  prosperous decade of the  1920s. In p a r t i c u l a r ,  Tmru  
noted t h e  p r o f i t  rate rose  from about 10 per  cen t  t o  12 per  cent  while t h e  
sha re  of corpora te  savings in GNP moved from 5 per cen t  t o  7 per  c e n t .  
Given such change, Tsuru claimed these  higher va lues  would no t  be 
sus ta ined (and thus  s tagnat ion  o r  c r i s i s  avoided) unless  t h e  components of 
GNE t h a t  ' o f f s e t '  savings could grow s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  maintain t h e i r  sha re  of 
GNE. More ana lys i s  led him t o  conclude, however, t h a t  both p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  
formation and n e t  expor ts  were a l ready near  t h e i r  c e i l i n g s  s o  expansion here  
would only increase  accumulation t o  f u r t h e r  exacerbate overproduction. Thus, 
s i n c e  c i v i l i a n  government spending w a s  a l s o  taken t o  be e f f e c t i v e l y  
constrained by some obs tac les  imposed by p r i v a t e  interests, the  only dynamic 
elements l e f t  t o  o f f s e t  savings are various forms of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  
waste. This  perspective,  i n  c o n t r a s t  with more orthodox Marxist doc t r ines ,  
provides a r e l a t i v e l y  new explanation f o r  the  growth of t h e  modern state 
with s t r o n g  governmental a c t i v i t y  -- whereby the  size of government rises 
with t h e  emergence of the  concentrat ion o r  consolidat ion of t h e  ' b i g  
economy' r a t h e r  than diminishing. The modern government does not  serve 
c a p i t a l  but ,  i n s t ead ,  is integrated within the  working of mature cap i t a l i sm 
when it genera tes  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  waste t o  o f f s e t  savings .  
In 1957, Tsuru (pp.  27-8, 1961 English t r a n s l a t i o n )  f e l t  t h a t  military 
spending w a s  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n  of waste although he questioned 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  of maintaining high peace-time l e v e l s  of m i l i t a r y  
spending beyond the  amount of 10.2 per  cent  of GNE i n  t h a t  year:  
[ I f ]  t h e  U.S. economy needs t h a t  r e l a t i v e  f i g u r e  of ten  percent  as 
an o f f s e t  t o  saving f o r  the  p rosper i ty  l e v e l  of economic 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  it would mean t h a t  its defense expenditure w i l l  have 
t o  amount t o  56 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  ten yea r s  from now when its gross  
domestic product is expected t o  rise t o  a l e v e l  of 560 b i l l i o n  
d o l l a r s .  We may say  (and we should l i k e  t o  say  f o r  t h e  sake of 
world peace) t h a t  it is r a t h e r  ques t ionable  i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  
can spend on defense as much as 16 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  more than today 
in 1968. 
To some ex ten t ,  h i s  doubt was j u s t i f i a b l e  bu t ,  by 1966, t h e  United S t a t e s  
w a s  not  a t  peace. Ins tead ,  it was q u i t e  deeply involved in the  Vietnam War 
with its annual l e v e l  of military spending amounting t o  $62 b i l l i o n .  
The impact of the  Vietnam c o n f l i c t  on the  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  U.S. economy 
is probably found in the  accelera t ion  of concentrat ion and t h e  movement 
within the  b i g  economy toward mi l i ta ry-re la ted  a c t i v i t i e s .  Kalecki,  a f t e r  
re turning from Cambridge t o  Warsaw, i d e n t i f i e d  the  transformation:  
I t  is m i l i t a r y  expenditures t h a t  now become t h e  motive f o r c e  of 
the  business upswing . . .  The s i t u a t i o n  is thus  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
from that p r i o r  t o  t h i s  period.  The increase  in m i l i t a r y  
expenditures c o n s t i t u t e s  one-half of t h e  increase of t h e  n a t i o n a l  
product; as a r e s u l t ,  t h e r e  appears a tendency f o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of na t iona l  income t o  t h e  armament i n d u s t r i e s .  (Kalecki,  1967, pp. 
109-10 > 
He suggested t h a t  i f  m i l i t a r y  expenditures were t o  continue increasing,  a 
major s h i f t  would occur i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  r u l i n g  c l a s s  in t h e  United 
S t a t e s .  The economic and p o l i t i c a l  pos i t ion  of 'new' bus iness  groups (which 
he linked with t h e  'predatory '  arms i n t e r e s t ,  pr imar i ly  located in  t h e  w e s t  
of t h e  country, and t h e  Bank of America as well  a s  with o i l  i n t e r e s t s  in  
Texas) might s trengthen r e l a t i v e  t o  the  pos i t ion  of t h e  eas te rn  business 
groups t h a t  had e a r l i e r  been p a r t  of a dominant e l i t e .  Competition f o r  power 
would, he f e l t ,  inevi tably  lead t o  a p o l i t i c a l  upheaval and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economic realignment: 
[The] ' o ld '  business groups should have se r ious  misgivings about 
the  continuation of the  w a r  i n  Vietnam: w h a t  is advantageous t o  
t h e i r  competitors undermines t h e i r  own economic and p o l i t i c a l  
pos i t ion  i n  the  r u l i n g  c l a s s  . . .  [The] more enlightened p a r t  of 
the U.S. ruling elite cannot help but see the rapid decline of 
American influence in Europe . . .  This aspect of the war in Vietnam 
is particularly important for the 'old' groups of b ig  business 
because they are linked to Europe by their heavy investment there. 
(ibid., pp. 111-2) 
WitMrawal from Vietnam might then depend on the outcome of the competitive 
struggle between rival business factions in the economic and political 
elite. 
Clearly there are substantial issues here that go much beyond our 
immediate concern with theoretical approaches to the political economy of 
military expenditures. In their simplest representations, these approaches 
(as revealed, for example, in the few references that we have cited from the 
neo-Marxist and institutionalist literature) yield five primary 
propositions. First, any underconsumption or overproduction tendencies, to 
the extent that these exist, are intensified by the specific rise in the 
'degree of monopoly' (Kalecki) or, more generally, by the qualitative shift 
from a competitive industrial structure to an oligopolistic one (Baran and 
Sweezy). Second, the prime force with which governments counter a tendency 
to stagnation or crisis arises from institutionalized waste. Third, spending 
on armaments is the most prominent form of institutionalized waste. Fourth, 
military spending permits the U.S. government to maintain an orderly 
realization of surplus and to propel both overall economic activity and 
employment because armaments do no.t directly compete with private 
investment. Finally, persistent institutionalization of military 
expenditures promotes the formation of the so-called military-industrial 
complex and the rise of armament producers in the Unitd States. 
Such s t r u c t u r a l  reasoning is problematical in two important respects 
which we should address.  One of these  arises from the  common preoccupation 
with the  antinomy of underconsumption o r  overproduction. This  preoccupation 
has an unfortunate consequence whereby debate is of ten  restricted t o  a 
mechanical format f o r  testing the  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  bas ic  d i a l e c t i c  context .  
The other  problem stems from t h e  form of empirical  s t u d i e s ,  which involve 
hybrids of Marxist hypotheses and macroeconomic ca tegor ies .  
Much of t h e  neo-Marxist and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  wr i t ings ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
adverse l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  t h i s  e l i c i t s ,  focus on t h e  proof o r  r e f u t a t i o n  of 
mechanisms o r  'laws of motion' f o r  modern capi ta l i sm.  The a t tendant  debate 
is la rge ly  dogmatic, in p a r t  because Baran and Sweezy formulated t h e  
'tendency of surplus  t o  rise' as a na tura l  lawunder monopoly capitalism-- 
a formulation t h a t  is c lose r  t o  the  b io log ica l  materialism of Engels and 
Lenin than t o  t h e  d i a l e c t i c a l - h i s t o r i c a l  myth of Marx.3 Underconsumption and 
overproduction, when in terpre ted  as a d i a l e c t i c  myth, can only be perceived 
a s  a complete context and thus  cannot be examined as an empirical  
hypothesis.  D i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h i s  area may be i l l u s t r a t e d  by reference  t o  t h e  
recent  s tudy by G r i f f i n  et a l .  (1982)) which seeks t o  ' sys temat ica l ly  assess 
the  neo-Marxist view t h a t  military expenditures are used by t h e  s t a t e  as a 
counter-cyclical f i s c a l  pol icy  e i t h e r  t o  f o r e s t a l l  a s e r i o u s  recession o r  t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  economic recovery' ( p .  S113). 
G r i f f i n  et a l .  formulate a 'policy-making' model and seek t o  c l a r i f y  
the  f a c t o r s  t h a t  induce governments t o  alter t h e i r  l e v e l s  of m i l i t a r y  
expenditures.  Unfortunately, they use t h e  r a t i o  of military spending t o  GNP 
as t h e i r  empirical v a r i a b l e  of i n t e r e s t  with t h e  following explanation (pp. 
Baran and Sweezy (1966, p. 72) q u i t e  e x p l i c i t l y  argue t h a t  the  
rising surp lus  must be viewed r e l a t i v e  t o  the  a c t u a l  n a t i o n a l  
output ( i . e . ,  GNP); t he  'absorption '  o r  ' r e a l i z a t i o n '  problem, 
then,  is how monopoly capital can 'absorb'  a s i g n i f i c a n t  por t ion  
of t h i s  output and, hence, 'realize' t h e  p r o f i t  embodied within it 
. . .  M i l i t a r y  expenditures expressed as a percentage of GNP measure 
p rec i se ly  t h e  degree t o  which na t iona l  output is absorbed by 
m i l i t a r y  spending. 
This  explanation shows t h a t  G r i f f i n  and h i s  a s soc ia tes  go beyond t h e i r  
i n i t i a l  aim and confuse two r e l a t e d  issues. One i s sue  stems from t h e  
o r i g i n a l  quest ion as t o  whether governments use v a r i a t i o n s  in  t h e  l e v e l  of 
mi l i t a ry - spend ing  as p a r t  of a countercycl ica l  po l i cy .  In  t h a t  context ,  
us ing  t h e  r a t i o  of military spending t o  GNP as a var i ab le  of i n t e r e s t  is 
q u i t e  unhelpful when t h e  authors  ignore the  complex way in  which t h e  a c t i o n s  
of any government a f f e c t  both p a r t s  of the  r a t i o .  (Only v a r i a b l e s  
p o t e n t i a l l y  a f f e c t i n g  m i l i t a r y  spending a r e  included i n  t h e i r  empirical  
explora t ions .  Thus in te rp re ta t ion  of t h e  f ind ings  of t h e  s tudy is adversely 
a f fec ted  by the  omission of add i t iona l  d i r e c t  influences on GNP.) 
A second, perhaps more s u b s t a n t i a l ,  i s sue  involves t h e  quest ion a s  t o  
whether m i l i t a r y  spending effectively absorbs ' surplus  p o t e n t i a l ' .  Again 
t h e i r  model does not  seem very u s e f u l .  To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  a t tendant  
d i f f i c u l t y ,  consider the  quest ion as  t o  whether a value of 30 per  cent  f o r  
t h e  share  of m i l i t a r y  spending in GNP w i l l  i nd ica te  a g r e a t e r  degree of 
surplus  absorption than some a l t e r n a t i v e  value,  say  10 per  cen t .  We suspect  
a reasonable answer t o  t h e  quest ion is 'not  necessa r i ly '  f o r  t h e  mere 
increase i n  m i l i t a r y  spending does not  inevi tably  lead t o  g r e a t e r  
absorption.  Since the  s i z e  of a surplus  p o t e n t i a l  is awkward t o  determine, 
w e  are faced with s u b s t a n t i a l  d i f f i c u l t y  i f  we want t o  show new military 
spending w i l l  absorb surplus  p o t e n t i a l  t h a t  would otherwise not  be 
rea l i zed .4  The i s sue  of measurement is highly re levant  f o r  tests. We simply 
cannot turn  t o  standard measures of productive capaci ty  because these  
indices  genera l ly  ignore the  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  changes in t h e  s o c i a l  
organizat ion of productive a c t i v i t i e s .  Empirical evidence is then obscure 
f o r  w e  have no benchmarks from which t o  f i x  t h e  ex ten t  of e i t h e r  
underconsumption o r  overproduction. Thus conventional myths can provide a 
context f o r  assess ing the  r o l e  of m i l i t a r y  expenditures but  without much 
hope of ever g iv ing a framework f o r  testing funct ional  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  an 
e x p l i c i t  manner. 
6. Faawe of k n  - 
Kalecki, T s u r u ,  and Baran and Sweezy s t ressed  the  process of 
concentration and they discussed the  g i a n t  corporation as a c e n t r a l  element 
in  understanding broad macroecanumic phenomena. However, in t h e i r  empirical  I 
work, these  authors l a rge ly  confined themselves t o  manipulation of aggregate 
ca tegor ies .  Kalecki (1943a, pp. 51-2) d id  indeed argue t h a t :  
The changes in t h e  degree of monopoly are not  only of dec i s ive  
importance f o r  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of na t iona l  income between workers 
and c a p i t a l i s t s ,  but  in some instances f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
income within the  capitalist class as well .  Thus, the  rise in  t h e  
degree of monopoly caused by the  growth of b i g  corporat ions 
r e s u l t s  i n  a r e l a t i v e  s h i f t  of income t o  i n d u s t r i e s  dominated by 
such corporat ions from other i n d u s t r i e s .  In t h i s  way, income is 
red i s t r ibu ted  from small t o  b i g  business.  
This  view was f u r t h e r  elaborated in Kalecki (1967) bu t ,  throughout h i s  
empirical  nork, t h e r e  is no attempt t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between small 
businesses and b igger  ones. Nor is t h e r e  a separa t ion  of old i n d u s t r i e s  from 
t h e i r  newer counterpar ts  in terms of t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  performance. S imi la r ly ,  
Tsuru d e a l t  with aggregate corporate saving and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  while Baran 
and Sweezy (1966, p .  369, f o r  example), sought t o  es t imate  t h e  'volume of 
economic surplus  produced by t h e  American economy' as a whole. 
The same heroic  framework of macro-Marxism is a l s o  used by opponents of 
t h e  various absorption schools  of thought. For example, Smith (1977, 1980) 
c r i t i c i z e s  t h e o r i e s  of both underconsumption and some r e l a t e d  conceptions of 
' m i l i t a r y  Keynesianism', as he terms them. He concludes, a f t e r  explor ing  
aggregate d a t a  f o r  15 OECD coun t r i e s ,  t h a t  m i l i t a r y  spending hinders 
economic growth i n  mature c a p i t a l i s t  economies. Furthermore, he r e j e c t s  any 
attempt t o  l i n k  military spending with d i r e c t  economic b e n e f i t s  t h a t  might 
accrue t o  separa te  pressure  groups a c t i n g  in  these  economies. While from a 
'narrow economic perspect ive '  such spending c o n s t i t u t e s  a ' n e t  c o s t '  t o  
capi ta l i sm,  it is needed, according t o  Smith (1977, p .  74)) t o  c r e a t e  ' a  
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  supers t ruc tu re  t o  d e f i n e '  t he  economic system. Smith 
repea t s  the  f laws of t h e  e a r l i e r  l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  he seeks t o  c r i t i c i z e .  
While he r e f e r s  t o  t h e  need f o r  concrete p o l i t i c a l  ana lys i s ,  t he  r o l e  of 
p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  groups of t h e  mi l i t a ry - indus t r i a l  complex, t h e  s t a t e  
bureaucracy, the  c a p i t a l i s t  p r o f i t s ,  and the  r a t e  of p r o f i t ,  he f a i l s  t o  
support  t h i s  language with empirical  d e f i n i t i o n s .  In  f a c t ,  t he  concepts  
disappear from h i s  ana lys i s  t o  be replaced with an a r r a y  of conventional 
macroeconomic ca tegor ies  -- GNP per  c a p i t a ,  the  r a t i o  of m i l i t a r y  spending 
t o  GNP, t h e  share  of investment in  na t iona l  expenditures, t h e  r a t e  of growth 
and t h e  average r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  -- which are c l e a r l y  inadequate f o r  h i s  
purposes. 
Underconsumptionist theor ie s  a s soc ia te  o v e r a l l  economic growth wi th  
su rp lus  absorption and the  i n t e r e s t s  of the  c a p i t a l i s t  c l a s s .  Smith suggests 
t h a t  s ince  m i l i t a r y  expenditures a r e  inverse ly  co r re la t ed  with aggregate 
economic growth ( o r  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t ed  t o  unemployment), such expenditures 
w i l l  undermine t h e  long-term interests of t h i s  c l a s s .  Both approaches are 
d e f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e i r  common r e l i a n c e  on macro-historical language leads  them 
t o  ignore some major aspects  of heterogeneity and dynamic adjustment. The 
outcome is an excessively-simple scenar io  focusing on whether t h e  system is 
working f o r  o r  aga ins t  i t s e l f . 5  
Such macro-historical reasoning is d i s tu rb ing  t o  u s .  We do no t  
recognize any mysterious long-term funct ions  o r  agenda t h a t  the  ' c a p i t a l i s t  
system' is s e t  t o  f u l f i l .  Economic growth is not  necessa r i ly  a common 
b e n e f i t  f o r  individuals  o r  groups t h a t  belong t o  a s o c i e t y .  Nor is 
s tagnat ion  a fully-shared cos t  t o  these  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  If an increase  i n  t h e  
l e v e l  of m i l i t a r y  spending f a i l s  t o  produce an expansion of o v e r a l l  economic 
a c t i v i t y ,  the  macro-historical perspect ive  (Marxist o r  ant i-Marxist)  may 
suggest t h a t  the  'system' s u f f e r s  but  a disaggregated assessment w i l l  show 
t h a t  while some economic agents  lose ,  o the r s  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t he  producers 
of arms) make s u b s t a n t i a l  ga ins .  The aggregate v i s ion  obscures t h e  
recognit ion of divergent  experiences. Marxists of ten  suggest  t h a t  t h e  
concept of a na t iona l  i n t e r e s t  is used t o  conceal the  dominant pos i t ion  of 
c a p i t a l  over labour but  t h e i r  a n a l y t i c a l  amalgamation of a monolithic 
c a p i t a l i s t  c l a s s  is highly misleading too .  There are important c o n f l i c t s  
between separa te  business groups whose members enjoy d i f f e r e n t  degrees of 
economic and p o l i t i c a l  power, which should be examined r a t h e r  than cover t ly  
ignored by aggregation. Stagnationary p r o f i t s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  can provide a 
means f o r  t h e  e levat ion  of a new group of corporat ions t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
detr iment  of o ther  groups. 
Some v a r i a n t s  of macro-Marxism involve s e c t o r a l  c l a s s e s  of economic 
a c t i v i t y .  Kalecki (1943a), f o r  example, chose t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  f in i shed-god  
i n d u s t r i e s  from raw-material i n d u s t r i e s  while a t t ach ing  h i s  concept of t h e  
degree of monopoly t o  pricing in only the  f i r s t  of these  two groups. He 
believed t h a t  raw mate r i a l s  were sub jec t  t o  specula t ive  cycles  s o  demand 
f a c t o r s  exert the  dec i s ive  influence on t h e i r  p r i c ing .  This  cha rac te r i za t ion  
is appropr ia te  f o r  some h i s t o r i c a l  per iods  and f o r  some raw mate r i a l s  but  it 
is not  un ive r sa l ly  acceptable.  A notable exception is provided by the  o i l  
indus t ry  a f t e r  t h e  formation of OPEC. During the  1970s, p r i c e  changes i n  
t h i s  indust ry  bore l i t t l e  r e l a t i o n  t o  e i t h e r  changes i n  t h e  consumption of 
o i l  o r  e r r a t i c  f luc tua t ions  i n  specula t ive  a c t i v i t y .  Instead t h e  p r i c e s  
r e f l e c t e d  the  manifest power of OPEC and the  l a rge  o i l  companies t o  increase  
the  r a t i o  of p r i c e s  t o  prime c o s t s  ( t h a t  i s ,  t o  change the  'degree of 
monopoly'). I f  w e  look even f u r t h e r  back in h i s to ry ,  the  p r i c e  of o i l  has  
r a r e l y  been s t r i c t l y  demand-determined s ince  Rockefeller success fu l ly  
consolidated a large pa r t  of the  o i l  industry in  the  second half of the  
nineteenth century. 
Baran and Sweezy (1966) preferred t o  d i f f e r en t i a t e  between a productive 
sector  and a f inanc ia l  sec tor ,  although one of them was l a t e r  t o  recant:  
In the  present s t a t e  of knowledge it is not possible t o  def ine  or 
del ineate  the  f inanc ia l  sector  with any accuracy, and perhaps it 
never w i l l  be . . .  [Most] of the large corporations which a r e  
o f f i c i a l l y  c l a s s i f i ed  as 'nonfinancial '  are, in r e a l i t y ,  at least 
t o  some extent and often t o  a subs tan t ia l  extent ,  engaged in  
f inanc ia l  operations such as buying and s e l l i n g  s e c u r i t i e s  and 
other ex is t ing  asse t s ,  borrowing and lending money, e t c .  (Magdoff 
and Sweezy, 1983, p . 97) 
Other authors, such as Grif f in  et a l .  adopt a dual-economy d i s t i nc t i on  
between a competitive sec tor  and a monopoly sector  as pa r t  of a framework 
tha t  is termed 'mil i tary  Keynesianism'. 
Following Gold (1977), Gr i f f in  et al. see the  U.S. regime being 
monitored by a corporat is t  coal i t ion of conf l ic t ing  i n t e r e s t s  involving 
monopoly cap i t a l ,  large labour unions and hawkish p o l i t i c a l  and mi l i t a ry  
elements. The compromise tha t  provides the  'glue' t o  maintain t h i s  coa l i t ion  
is a d i r e c t  commitment t o  expand aggregate demand through mi l i t a ry  
government spending ra ther  than through non-military government spending. 
Gr i f f in  et a l .  a r e  influenced by O'Connor (1973) t o  a s se r t  that governments 
a re  insensi t ive  t o  overal l  stagnation tendencies but they a r e  a t t en t ive  t o  
perceived d i f f i c u l t i e s  occurring in  the  monopoly sec tor .  These asser t ions  
a r e  converted in to  empirical hypotheses t h a t  governments r a i s e  t h e i r  level  
of mi l i t a ry  expenditures when the r a t e  of growth of monopoly p r o f i t s  f a l l s  
and when the  r a t e  of unemployment f o r  unionized workers increases,  but 
governments ignore similar condi t ions  when they p r e v a i l  i n  t h e  competi t ive 
s e c t o r  o r  a f f e c t  p a r t s  of t h e  non-unionized labour fo rce .  
P a r t  of t h e  conversion t o  empirical hypotheses involves a p r i o r  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  dimensions of t h e  two s e c t o r s .  I n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
case ,  t h e  monopoly s e c t o r  is taken t o  include mining, cons t ruct ion ,  real 
e s t a t e  and a l l  durable  and nondurable manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s  with t h e  
notable  exceptions of lumber, l e a t h e r ,  f u r n i t u r e ,  t e x t i l e  and appare l  
i n d u s t r i e s  -- s o  t h e  s e c t o r  holds 90 per  cent  of t o t a l  a s s e t s ,  r ece ives  75 
per  cent  of a l l  p r o f i t s  and accounts f o r  50 per  cent  of p r i v a t e  employment. 
Some of the  i n d u s t r i e s  in  t h i s  list may be more 'monopolistic '  than those  in 
t h e  corresponding assignment f o r  t h e  'competi t ive '  s e c t o r  but  nothing in  t h e  
choice of cons t i tuen t  elements c l a r i f i e s  why we should expect p r o f i t s  in t h e  
two s e c t o r s  t o  move in opposi te  d i r e c t i o n s ,  o r  even t o  change a t  d i f f e r e n t  
r a t e s !  This  c r i t i c i s m  needs t o  be e labora ted .  While G r i f f i n  et al. ( p .  S127) 
contend 'monopoly capital is the  economically more powerful of t h e  s e c t o r s ,  
and t h e  s t a t e ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  f inance  accumulation and/or legi t imat ion  programs 
depends d ispropor t ionate ly  on revenues from monopoly s e c t o r  p r o f i t s ' ,  they 
ignore t h e  heterogeneity of experiences within s e c t o r s .  The monopoly s e c t o r  
includes very large businesses a s  well  as medium and small ones bu t  t h e  
authors  should consider  only the  l a rge  corpora t ions  as forming monopoly 
c a p i t a l .  For ins tance ,  it is C i t i c o r p  and American Express, r a t h e r  than 
small one-branch banks o r  savings and loans as soc ia t ions ,  which a r e  
powerful. S imi la r ly ,  it is t h e  revenue of companies such a s  IBM o r  Unisys 
which pay the  bulk of corporate t axes .  The a r b i t r a r y  s e c t o r a l  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  ignoring i n t r a s e c t o r a l  d i f f e rences ,  is unhelpful .  
The d i a l e c t i c a l  myth of tendencies f o r  underconsumption o r  
overproduction provides an o v e r a l l  context  f o r  t h e  s tudy of military 
spending in r e l a t i o n  t o  the  dynamics of market s t r u c t u r e .  However, l i t t l e  
knowledge is acquired e i t h e r  from s t a t i s t i c a l  attempts t o  v a l i d a t e  these  
tendencies (o r  t o  r e f u t e  them) o r  from t h e  imposition of simple 'laws of 
motion' on human h i s to ry  as a means of exp l i ca t ing  t h e  eventual  breakdown of 
t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  'system'. The aggregate categor ies  of macro-Marxism should be 
abandoned and we should a l s o  move beyond excessive r e l i a n c e  on t h e  f a m i l i a r  
Standard I n d u s t r i a l  C lass i f i ca t ion  f o r  s e c t o r a l  s t u d i e s  of economic 
development. Economic power in the  United S t a t e s  r e s ides  in t h e  con t ro l  and 
operation of t h e  l a r g e s t  corporat ions.  Our o ther  papers focus on t h e  
a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  prominent corporate members of t h e  armadollar-petrodollar 
coalition, which w e  de f ine  t o  include t h e  l a rge  armament producers, energy 
companies and ( t o  a l e s s e r  ex ten t )  some f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  These 
a c t i v i t i e s  are c r u c i a l  ingredients  f o r  any understanding of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
economy f o r  both arms and o i l  indus t r i e s .  
LEADING OIL COMPANIES: 
SALES AND NFT INCOME 
($ million) 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Chevron 
British 
Petroleum Exxon 
Sales 
2,698 
3,298 
3,635 
3,825 
4,188 
5,143 
5,829 
7,762 
17,191 
16,822 
19,434 
20,917 
23,232 
29,948 
40,479 
44,224 
34,362 
27,342 
26,798 
41,742 
23,351 
26,015 
Sales 
2,534 
2,595 
3,260 
3,424 
4,062 
5,193 
5,709 
7,723 
18,354 
15,718 
17,988 
23,035 
29,127 
40,501 
49,368 
49,192 
47,524 
47,122 
43,926 
59,225 
39,856 
45,206 
Sales 
12,191 
13,266 
14,091 
14,930 
16,554 
18,701 
20,310 
25,724 
42,062 
44,865 
48,631 
54,126 
60,335 
79,106 
103,143 
108,108 
97,173 
88,561 
90,854 
86,673 
69,888 
76,416 
Net 
Income 
401 
422 
452 
454 
455 
511 
547 
844 
970 
773 
880 
1,016 
1,106 
1,785 
2,401 
2,380 
1,377 
1,590 
1,534 
1,547 
715 
1,007 
Net 
Income 
221 
154 
243 
232 
218 
361 
176 
760 
1,118 
293 
306 
688 
907 
3,598 
3,430 
2,047 
1,160 
1,257 
1,624 
2,309 
732 
2,280 
Net 
Income 
1,091 
1,192 
1,277 
1,243 
1,310 
1,517 
1,532 
2,443 
3,142 
2,503 
2,641 
2,423 
2,763 
4,295 
5,650 
5,567 
4,186 
4,978 
5,528 
4,870 
5,360 
4,840 
1 (continued) 
LEADING OIL COMPANIES: 
SALES AND NET INCOME 
($ mil l ion)  
SOURCE: Data f o r  B r i t i s h  Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil and Texaco a r e  
from Standard & Poor ' s  Compustat Services  (1986) Industrial 
Compustat, Compustat II/130-Item Annual Magnetic Tape ( f o r  1966- 
1985); 'The Fortune 500', Fortune, April 27, 1987 and April 25, 
1988, 'The In te rna t iona l  500', Fortune, August 3, 1987 and August 
1, 1988 ( f o r  1986-1987). 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Data f o r  Royal Dutch/Shell are from 'The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  200' and 
'The In te rna t iona l  500 ' , Fortune, 1967-1988. 
Mobil 
Sa les  
5,254 
5,772 
6,221 
6,621 
7,261 
8,243 
9,166 
11,390 
18,929 
20,620 
26,063 
32,126 
34,736 
44,721 
59,510 
64,488 
59,946 
54,607 
56,047 
55,960 
44,866 
51,223 
Net 
Income 
356 
385 
431 
456 
483 
541 
574 
849 
1,047 
810 
943 
1,005 
1,126 
2,007 
2,813 
2,433 
1,380 
1,503 
1,268 
1,040 
1,407 
1,258 
Royal Dutch/ 
S h e l l  
Sa les  
4,533 
5,026 
5,530 
5,851 
6,310 
7,244 
8,510 
10,867 
19,311 
17,516 
20,388 
26,052 
28,085 
37,464 
47,352 
46,530 
50,271 
48,250 
50,874 
48,937 
64,843 
78,319 
Texaco 
Net 
Income 
397 
439 
519 
568 
528 
529 
418 
1,066 
1,618 
1,177 
1,460 
1,573 
1,414 
4,158 
2,972 
2,197 
2,093 
2,493 
2,930 
2,326 
3,726 
4,726 
S a l e s  
4,427 
5,121 
5,460 
5,868 
6,350 
7,529 
8,693 
11,407 
23,255 
24,508 
26,452 
27,921 
28,608 
38,350 
51,196 
57,628 
46,986 
40,068 
47,334 
46,297 
31,613 
34,372 
Net 
Income 
710 
754 
836 
770 
822 
904 
889 
1,292 
1,586 
83 1 
870 
93 1 
852 
1,759 
2,240 
2,310 
1,281 
1,233 
306 
1,233 
725 
-4,407 
LEADING ARMAMENT COMPANIES: 
SALES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS (WD PCA) AND NET INCOME= 
($ mil l ion)  
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
198 1 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
General 
Dynamics Boe ing 
Net 
Incon~e 
54 
5 1 
30 
3 
-7 
21 
26 
40 
52 
81 
100 
103 
-48 
185 
195 
124 
160 
287 
382 
372 
-52 
437 
J 
S a l e s  
2,357 
2,880 
3,274 
2,835 
3,677 
3,040 
2,370 
3,335 
3,731 
3,719 
3,919 
4,019 
5,463 
8,131 
9,426 
9,788 
9,035 
11,125 
10,354 
13,636 
16,341 
15,355 
Sa les  
1,797 
2,253 
2,662 
2,509 
2,224 
1,869 
1,539 
1,642 
1,968 
2,160 
2,553 
2,901 
3,205 
4,060 
4,743 
5,063 
6,145 
7,146 
7,839 
8,163 
9,211 
9,344 
WD 
PCA 
1,136 
1,832 
2,239 
1,243 
1,183 
1,489 
1,289 
707 
1,853 
1,289 
1,073 
1,372 
4,154 
3,492 
3,515 
3,402 
5,891 
6,818 
5,952 
7,440 
8,013 
---- 
WD 
PCA 
9 14 
912 
762 
653 
475 
732 
1,171 
1,229 
1,076 
1,561 
1,176 
1,580 
1,524 
1,514 
2,385 
2,683 
3,239 
4,423 
4,564 
5,458 
3,556 
---- 
Net 
Income 
76 
84 
83 
10 
22 
22 
30 
51 
72 
76 
103 
180 
323 
505 
600 
473 
292 
355 
787 
566 
665 
480 
LEADING ARMAMENT COMPANIES: 
SALES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS (WD JXA) AND NET INCOME= 
($ million) 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
General 
Motors 
Sales 
20,209 
20,026 
22,755 
24,295 
18,752 
28,264 
30,435 
35,798 
31,550 
35,725 
47,181 
54,961 
63,221 
66,311 
57,729 
62,699 
60,026 
74,581 
83,890 
96,372 
102,814 
101,782 
General 
E l ec t r i c  
Net 
Income 
339 
361 
357 
278 
328 
472 
530 
585 
608 
581 
931 
1,088 
1,230 
1,409 
1,514 
1,652 
1,817 
2,024 
2,280 
2,336 
2,492 
2,915 
WD 
PCA 
508 
625 
630 
547 
386 
344 
256 
249 
300 
390 
345 
380 
420 
449 
509 
622 
690 
893 
1,019 
1,614 
5,069 
---- 
Sales  
7,177 
7,741 
8,382 
8,448 
8,727 
9,425 
10,239 
11,575 
13,413 
13,399 
15,697 
17,519 
19,654 
22,461 
24,959 
27,240 
26,500 
26,797 
27,947 
28,285 
35,211 
39,315 
Net 
Income 
1,793 
1,627 
1,732 
1,711 
609 
1,936 
2,163 
2,398 
950 
1,253 
2,903 
3,338 
3,508 
2,893 
-762 
333 
963 
3,730 
4,516 
3,999 
2,945 
3,551 
WD 
JXA 
1,187 
1,290 
1,489 
1,621 
1,000 
1,041 
1,259 
1,416 
1,211 
1,264 
1,347 
1,520 
1,786 
2,042 
2,202 
3,018 
3,654 
4,518 
4,514 
5,891 
6,847 
---- 
LEADING ARMAMENT COMPANIES': 
SALES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS (WD PCA) AND NET INCOME= 
($ m i l l i o n )  
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Grumman 
Sales 
1,059 
969 
1,153 
1,180 
993 
799 
683 
1,083 
1,113 
1,329 
1,502 
1,553 
1,455 
1,476 
1,729 
1,916 
2,003 
2,220 
2,558 
3,049 
3,440 
3,325 
L o c k h e e d  
Sales 
2,085 
2,335 
2,217 
2,075 
2,536 
2,852 
2,473 
2,757 
3,279 
3,387 
3,203 
3,373 
3,485 
4,058 
5,396 
5,176 
5,613 
6,490 
8,113 
9,535 
10,273 
11,370 
WD 
PCA 
333 
488 
629 
417 
661 
1,098 
1,120 
909 
687 
1,343 
982 
1,428 
1,180 
1,364 
1,322 
1,710 
1,900 
2,298 
2,419 
2,733 
2,967 
---- 
N e t  
Income 
28 
21 
19 
22 
20 
-18 
-70 
17 
20 
24 
24 
32 
22 
20 
31 
20 
90 
110 
108 
82 
79 
36 
WD 
PCA 
1,531 
1,807 
1,870 
2,040 
1,848 
1,510 
1,705 
1,659 
1,464 
2,080 
1,510 
1,673 
2,226 
1,797 
2,037 
2,657 
3,499 
4,006 
4,967 
5,082 
4,897 
---- 
Net 
I n c o m e  
59 
54 
44 
-33 
-86 
12 
13 
14 
23 
45 
39 
55 
55 
36 
28 
155 
207 
263 
344 
40 1 
408 
421 
TFJhle 2 (continued) 
LEADING ARMAMENT COMPANIES: 
SALES, DEPAE?lWNT OF DEFENSE PLUME CONTRACT AWARDS (DOD PCA) AND NET INCOME= 
($ million) 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
McDomell 
Douglas 
Sales 
1,060 
2,934 
3,609 
3,024 
2,088 
2,069 
2,726 
3,033 
3,075 
3,256 
3,544 
3,545 
4,130 
5,279 
6,066 
7,385 
7,331 
8,111 
9,633 
11,478 
12,661 
13,146 
Raytheon 
Sales 
709 
1,106 
1,158 
1,285 
1,259 
1,308 
1,465 
1,590 
1,929 
2,245 
2,463 
2,818 
3,239 
3,728 
5,002 
5,636 
5,513 
5,937 
5,996 
6,409 
7,308 
7,660 
WD 
PCA 
722 
2,125 
1,200 
1,070 
883 
897 
1,700 
1,143 
1,309 
1,398 
2,465 
2,574 
2,863 
3,229 
3,247 
4,409 
5,630 
6,143 
7,684 
8,857 
6,586 
---- 
Net 
Income 
43 
1 
95 
118 
93 
81 
112 
130 
107 
86 
109 
123 
161 
199 
145 
177 
215 
275 
325 
346 
277 
313 
W D  
PCA 
368 
403 
452 
547 
380 
454 
507 
677 
740 
681 
784 
1,041 
1,307 
1,249 
1,745 
1,826 
2,262 
2,728 
3,093 
2,999 
4,052 
---- 
Net 
Income 
18 
29 
31 
35 
34 
35 
41 
46 
58 
7 1 
85 
113 
150 
197 
282 
324 
319 
300 
340 
376 
393 
445 
2 (continued) 
LEADING ARMAMENT COMPANIES: 
SALES, DEP- OF DEFENSE PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS (WD FCA) AND NET INCOME= 
($ million) 
SOURCE: Sales and net income data a re  from Standard & Poor's Compustat 
Services (1986) I n d u s t r i a l  Campustat, Compustat II/130-Item Annual 
Magnetic Tape ( fo r  1966-1985); 'The Fortune 500') Fortune,  April 
27, 1987 and April 25, 1988 ( for  1986-1987). 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
198 1 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Department of Defense Prime Contract Awards (KID PCA) are  from 
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, 
Directorate for  Information Operation and Reports, 100 Companies 
Rece iv ing  The Larges t  Do l la r  Volume o f  Prime Contrac t  A d s  
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office),  annual, 1966-1986. 
a Sales and net income data are  for  calender years while DOD PCA figures 
are  for  f i s c a l  years. 
b United Aircraft un t i l  1974. 
Rockwell 
International 
United 
~echnologies  
Sales 
2,024 
2,438 
2,640 
2,667 
2,411 
2,211 
2,363 
3,179 
4,408 
4,943 
5,195 
5,859 
5,669 
6,176 
6,906 
7,040 
7,395 
8,098 
9,322 
11,338 
11,794 
12,123 
Sales 
1,665 
2,215 
2,411 
2,354 
2,353 
2,031 
2,028 
2,293 
3,328 
3,878 
5,166 
5,551 
6,265 
9,053 
12,324 
13,668 
13,577 
14,669 
16,332 
14,992 
15,669 
17,170 
WD 
PCA 
520 
689 
669 
674 
707 
478 
703 
704 
819 
732 
966 
1,480 
890 
684 
969 
1,126 
2,691 
4,545 
6,219 
6,264 
5,590 
---- 
Net 
Income 
49 
68 
74 
65 
65 
69 
78 
126 
130 
102 
121 
144 
209 
261 
280 
292 
332 
389 
496 
595 
605 
635 
WD 
FCA 
1,139 
1,097 
1,326 
997 
874 
733 
996 
74 1 
1,212 
1,407 
,1,233 
1,585 
2,400 
2,554 
3,109 
3,776 
4,208 
3,867 
3,207 
3,906 
3,527 
---- 
Net 
Incorue 
47 
57 
6 1 
5 1 
45 
-44 
51 
58 
105 
117 
157 
196 
234 
326 
393 
458 
427 
509 
645 
636 
73 
592 
Notes 
1. The debate surrounding t h e  concept of 'waste ' ,  e spec ia l ly  c o n f l i c t  over 
its d e f i n i t i o n  and measurement, has p e r s i s t e d  s i n c e  the  days of Adam Smith. 
Any d e f i n i t i o n  requ i res  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of productive a c t i v i t i e s  from 
unproductive ones -- a major epistemological hazard. We can argue t h a t  
m i l i t a r y  spending is no t  a necessary c o s t  f o r  t h e  reproduction of t h e  labour 
fo rce  and s o ,  from t h i s  l imi ted  starting po in t ,  w e  can class such spending 
as 'waste ' .  However, m i l i t a r y  expenditures can still be viewed a s  a 
necessary cos t  of promoting ' na t iona l  i n t e g r i t y '  (Veblen, 1923, ch .  2 )  but  
t h i s  cos t  is then one of maintenance of s o c i a l  order  r a t h e r  than one of t h e  
production of usable  commodities per se. 
2. The a r t i c l e  was published in t h e  Japanese journal  Sekai in 1957. An 
Ehglish version,  Tsuru (1961), appeared f i v e  years  before publ ica t ion  of 
Monopoly Capital. 
3. Hegel (1967, pp. 149-50, f o r  example) acknowledged the  myth of 
cont radic t ions  embedded within t h e  s o c i e t a l  s t r u c t u r e ;  namely, t h e  a s s e r t i o n  
t h a t  excess c a p i t a l  accumulation and t h e  concentrat ion process are j o i n t l y  
revealed with t h e  underconsumption of t h e  masses o r  overproduction of 
indust ry .  Marx (1973a,b; 1909, Vol. 111) was a l s o  f a m i l i a r  with t h e  
important r o l e  of government d e f i c i t s  and na t iona l  debt  in providing an 
add i t iona l  o u t l e t  f o r  investment by the  a r i s toc racy  of f inance .  Both Hegel 
and Marx were a l s o  acquainted with e a r l y  m u l t i p l i e r  t h e o r i e s  but  n e i t h e r  of 
them considered t h e i r  promulgation as a so lu t ion  t o  an antinomy, which they 
saw as  embedded within modern soc ie ty .  
4. Recall too  t h a t  Baran and Sweezy argued t h e  tendency f o r  t h e  su rp lus  t o  
r i s e  would mate r i a l i ze  only i f  t h i s  surplus  w a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  absorbed -- f o r  
otherwise s tagnat ion  occurs.  
5 .  See Schumpeter (1951) on the  cos t  of imperialism. Note too  the  
perception of Tuchman (1984) t h a t  t h e  f o l l y  of p o l i t i c a l  l eader s  of ten  
undermines the  na t iona l  i n t e r e s t  o r  common w i l l .  Both adopt a macro- 
h i s t o r i c a l  perspect ive .  
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